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1.  Introduction 
 
By judgment of 19 April 2016 the Russian Constitutional Court 
ruled out that it could fully execute the judgment of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the Anchugov and Gladkov v Rus-
sia1 case, in which the ECtHR held that the Russian Federation had vio-
lated Article 3 of Protocol I to the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR) because prisoners in Russia were denied the right to 
vote.2  
The Russian Constitutional Court’s judgment follows its earlier de-
cision in which – in general terms and not linked to any specific case3 – 
it had raised the possibility of not executing at all or only partially exe-
cuting specific ECtHR judgments concerning Russia should they be 
* Professor of International Law, University of Siena and Luiss Guido Carli (Rome). 
1 Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia App nos 11157/04 and 15162/05 (ECtHR, 4 July 
2013). 
2 See Judgment no 12-P/2016 ‘in the case concerning the resolution of the question 
of possibility to execute the Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 4 July 
2013 in the case of Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia in accordance with the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation in respect to the request of the Ministry of 
Justice of the Russian Federation’. Unofficial English translation available at 
<www.ksrf.ru/en/Decision/Judgments/Documents/2016_April_19_12-P.pdf>. 
3 The legal ground for the two judgments is the law amending the powers of the 
Russian Constitutional Court that entered into force on 14 December 2015. For a 
comment see N Chaeva, ‘The Russian Constitutional Court and its Actual Control over 
the ECtHR Judgement in Anchugov and Gladkov’, EJIL: Talk! (26 April 2016) and, in 
more detail, Interim Opinion no 832/2015 of 15 March 2016, delivered by the 
European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), ‘On the 
Amendments to the Federal Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation’ paras 28-34, available at <www.venice.coe.int>. 
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held to be contrary to the Russian Constitution.4 In that earlier decision 
the Russian Constitutional Court clarified the procedure that would 
now trigger a review of the constitutionality of an ECHR provision or 
the execution of an ECtHR judgment: the first situation, deriving from 
an application filed by a domestic court, involves the constitutionality of 
a national law where the ECtHR has held it to be contrary to the 
ECHR; the second situation arises when there is a doubt as to constitu-
tionality with specific reference to the execution of an ECtHR judgment 
in the internal legal system. In this second situation, the application to 
the Russian Constitutional Court can be filed by the President or a 
member of the Russian government, as occurred in the case under dis-
cussion here since the application was filed by the Ministry of Justice of 
the Russian Federation. 
The April 2016 judgment poses a series of important legal question 
ranging from the obligation of the Contracting Parties to the ECHR to 
abide by judgments of the Strasbourg Court to the more general issue of 
observance of the fundamental provisions of the ECHR and the rela-
tionship between the domestic legal orders of the Contracting Parties 
and the ECHR. Regarding this latter aspect, a key topical issue is Con-
tracting Parties’ invoking of constitutional limits when it comes to their 
obligations to observe the ECHR. 
 
 
2.  The judgment of the ECtHR in the Anchugov and Gladkov case 
 
The judgment of the Russian Constitutional Court originates from 
the Russian Federation’s obligation to execute – pursuant to Article 46 
of the ECHR – the ECtHR judgment in the Anchugov and Gladkov case 
in that country’s own domestic legal system. 
4 Judgment no 21-P/2015 of 14 July 2015. It would appear that the judgment has 
been published only in Russian. For a comment see M Smimova, ‘Russian 
Constitutional Court Affirms Russian Constitution’s Supremacy over ECtHR Decisions’ 
EJIL: Talk! (15 July 2015); M Aksenova, ‘Anchugov and Gladkov is not Enforceable: 
the Russian Constitutional Court Opines in its First ECtHR Implementation Case’ 
Opinio Juris (25 April 2016). 
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In the aforementioned decision the ECtHR held that Russia had 
violated the right to free elections.5 On the basis of Article 32 of the 
Russian Constitution,6 referred to in various Russian federal laws,7 the 
applicants were in fact deprived of this right in relation to numerous 
parliamentary and presidential elections between 2000 and 2008 follow-
ing their sentencing to a term of imprisonment for having committed 
serious crimes in Russia.  
Referring to principles laid down in its own case law the ECtHR 
stated in general that ‘there is no question that a prisoner forfeits his 
Convention rights merely because of his status as a person detained fol-
lowing conviction’ and that the ECHR system bans ‘automatic disen-
franchisement based purely on what might offend public opinion’. The 
Court clarified that the measure of disenfranchisement must also be ap-
plied in conformity with the principle of proportionality and hence the 
lawfulness of the measure must be based on a finding of ‘discernible 
and sufficient link between the sanction and the conduct and circum-
stances of the individual concerned’.8 
Acknowledging that Contracting Parties enjoy a certain margin of 
appreciation as regards limiting the right to vote of prisoners, the ECtHR 
considered ‘a blanket restriction’ on all convicted prisoners as contrary 
to the ECHR where disenfranchisement is applied automatically to all 
prisoners ‘irrespective of the length of their sentence and irrespective of 
the nature or gravity of their offence and their individual circumstanc-
es’.9 However, the Court affords some leeway to national legal systems 
or judicial practice that limit the cases in which individuals are deprived 
of the right to vote, when disenfranchisement is applied only in respect 
of certain serious offences ‘against the State or the judicial system’ or for 
5 Art 3 of Protocol I to the ECHR: ‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to 
hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will 
ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature’. 
6 According to para 3 of art 32 citizens kept in places of deprivation of liberty 
under a court sentence are deprived of the right to elect and be elected. 
7 For the list of federal laws that incorporated the constitutional rule in question, 
see judgment no 12-P/2016 (n 1) para 1. 
8 Anchugov and Gladkov (n 1) para 97. 
9 ibid para 99, in which the Court expressly referred to what was stated in its 
judgment Hirst v the United Kingdom (No 2), App no 74025/01 (ECtHR, 6 October 
2005) para 82. 
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offences punishable by a term of imprisonment of three years or more.10 
In that case the Court is also mindful of the fact that under the same na-
tional law it is possible for a convicted person who has been permanent-
ly deprived of the right to vote to recover that right on condition that a 
certain length of time has elapsed since the conviction and the individu-
al concerned has exhibited, amongst other conditions, ‘a consistent and 
genuine display of good conduct’.11 Considering that national legislation 
of this type would be compatible with the ECHR, the Court appreciates 
above all any effort made by the legislator to adjust the application of the 
measure of disenfranchisement to the particular circumstances of each 
case ‘taking into account such factors as the gravity of the offence com-
mitted and the conduct of the offender’.12 
It should be noted that the ECtHR considers that the margin of ap-
preciation enjoyed by a State covers disenfranchisement – subject of 
course to the limits set out in the Court’s case law – not only where that 
measure stems in concrete from a court decision but also where it 
comes about in another way,13 for example, based on a decision adopted 
by administrative authorities under national legal provisions. From this 
standpoint the Court demonstrates both deep knowledge of national 
laws concerning restrictions on the right to vote of prisoners and a cer-
tain willingness and flexibility in broadening the margin of appreciation 
afforded to Contracting Parties under the ECHR. 
With specific regard to its judgment in the Anchugov and Gladkov 
case, it should be noted that the ECtHR likened the law in Russia to 
that in the United Kingdom and considered among others14 by it in the 
Hirst case. According to the Court the applicants ‘were stripped of their 
right to vote by virtue of Article 32(3) of the Russian Constitution 
which applied to all persons convicted and serving a custodial sentence, 
irrespective of the length of their sentence and irrespective of the nature 
10 Scoppola v Italy (No. 3) App no 126/05 (ECtHR, 22 May 2012) para 106. 
11 ibid para 109. 
12 ibid para 106. The passages of the judgment adopted in the Scoppola case are 
summarily referred to in Anchugov and Gladkov (n 1) para 100. 
13 See the judgment in the Scoppola case (n 10) para 104. 
14 For further references regarding ECtHR case law concerning the United 
Kingdom and other countries, see P Pustorino, ‘Detainee’s Right to Vote between 
CJEU and ECtHR Case Law’ SIDIBlog (6 November 2015) <www.sidiblog.org/ 
2015/11/06/detainees-right-to-vote-between-cjeu-and-ecthr-case-law>. 
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or gravity of their offence and their individual circumstances’.15 With 
special reference to the scope of the legislative provisions and the pro-
portionality of the national measures adopted, the Court rejected the 
Russian government’s arguments as to the limited application in prac-
tice of disenfranchisement since that was not sufficiently proved during 
the proceedings. In this respect the Russian government had claimed, 
firstly, that disenfranchisement affected solely prisoners convicted of 
serious offences and, secondly, that the domestic courts took into con-
sideration all relevant circumstances, including the nature and degree of 
public dangerousness of the criminal offence and the defendant’s per-
sonality.16 On the contrary, according to the ECtHR disenfranchisement 
in Russia ‘concerns a wide range of offenders and sentences, from two 
months (which is the minimum period of imprisonment following con-
viction in Russia) to life and from relatively minor offences to offences 
of the utmost seriousness’.17 
As regards the further objection of the Russian government hinging 
on the fact that in the Russian legal system the preclusion of the right to 
vote of prisoners is based on constitutional provisions and not ‘ordi-
nary’ legal instruments, the ECtHR easily dismissed it by reiterating that 
domestic law, including that of constitutional rank, does not exempt 
Contracting Parties from respecting the rights and freedoms of every-
one within the jurisdiction of the States, pursuant to Article 1 of the 
ECHR and in line with the general principle set forth in Article 27 of 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.18 
Finally, acknowledging the likely difficulty for the Russian govern-
ment to execute the ECtHR judgement and avoid further judgments 
against it, the Court asserted that the question of the right to vote of 
prisoners in the Russian legal system can be addressed adopting ‘various 
approaches’ and in particular ‘through some form of political process or 
15 Anchugov and Gladkov (n 1) para 101. 
16 The Russian government’s position regarding the limited and ‘reasoned’ 
application by the courts of the measure of deprivation of liberty and hence 
disenfranchisement was referred to and accepted by the Russian Constitutional Court 
on the base of ‘statistical data’ and ‘official statistics’: see judgment no 12-P/2016 (n 2) 
para 5.3. 
17 Anchugov and Gladkov (n 1) para 105. 
18 ibid para 108. 
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by interpreting the Russian Constitution by the competent authorities’,19 
therefore alluding to an amendment of the Constitution or, alternative-
ly, an interpretation of the relevant constitutional provisions in harmony 
with the ECHR and ECtHR case law in such a way as to coordinate 
their effects and avoid any conflict between them. 
 
 
3.  The judgment of the Russian Constitutional Court of 19 April 2016 
on the execution of the ECtHR’s decision in the Anchugov and Glad-
kov case: the Supremacy of the Russian Constitution 
 
Turning now to analysing the general arguments set out in the 
judgment of the Russian Constitutional Court,20 it should be noted that 
the decision in question can be construed as part of a tendency to essen-
tially apply ECtHR judgments à la carte, choosing to execute solely the 
portions thereof considered to be compatible with the Constitution and 
discarding the rest. 
In brief, the Russian Constitutional Court expressly held that it 
could not execute the ECtHR’s judgment in the Anchugov and Gladkov 
case as regards its measures of a general character contemplating a 
change in the national law on deprivation of the right to vote for all 
convicted persons serving a sentence in places of deprivation of liberty 
under a court decision. The Court ruled out also execution of the EC-
tHR’s measures of an individual character in favour of the two appli-
cants because they had been sentenced to long terms and for the com-
mission of particularly grave crimes.21  
By contrast, the Russian Constitutional Court held that it would be 
compatible with the Constitution to execute the portion of the ECtHR’s 
judgment concerning the conformity of Russia’s legislation and judicial 
practice with the measures of a general character consisting of taking 
into account, in the matter of the deprivation of the right to vote, ele-
ments of justice, proportionality and differentiation in the application of 
the disenfranchisement measure. More specifically, according to the 
19 ibid para 111. 
20 The Russian Constitutional Court’s more specific arguments are analysed in the 
following sections of this work. 
21 See points 1 and 3 of the operative part of the judgment no 12-P/2016 (n 2). 
 
 
Russian Constitutional Court and execution ‘à la carte’ of ECtHR judgments                  11 
 
Russian Constitutional Court, the execution of that portion of the 
judgment would ensure a reduction of cases entailing a sentence impos-
ing a deprivation of liberty and consequently a deprivation of electoral 
rights.22 
In reality, even conformity with this last portion of the ECtHR 
judgment is more apparent than real. In fact, the Russian Constitutional 
Court did not consider that Russia, as a Contracting Party to the 
ECHR, is obliged to execute at least this ‘residual’ part of the judgment 
and hence reduce the number of cases of deprivation of the electoral 
rights for individuals sentenced to imprisonment. Rather, the Constitu-
tional Court limited itself to asserting that it would favour legislation 
and judicial practice that reduce the application of the measure of dep-
rivation of liberty, which if imposed would continue to be flanked by 
the automatic suspension of voting rights.  
In any case, the legal basis for this ‘selection’ consists of the fact that 
while the Russian Constitutional Court pointed out that the ECHR ‘is 
an integral part’ of the Russian legal system, that the relationship be-
tween the two systems must be based on ‘a dialogue’ and that the Con-
stitution is ‘a non-contradictory legal system’,23 it went on to assert that 
the effectiveness of the ECHR ‘depends on the respect of the European 
Court of Human Rights for national identity’ 24 and to stress, as specifi-
cally regards the execution of ECtHR’s judgments, ‘the priority of the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation for Russia’s legal system’ and its 
‘supremacy and supreme legal force’.25  
It is worth highlighting that according to the Russian Constitutional 
Court the supremacy of the Russian Constitution over the ECHR and 
hence the ability not to execute judgments of the ECtHR is perfectly in 
line with the principle of subsidiarity governing relations between the 
domestic legal systems of the Contracting Parties and the ECHR.26  
Based on the above premise the Russian Constitutional Court ruled 
out that the prohibition contained in Article 32(3) of the Russian Con-
stitution can be subject to exceptions or restrictive interpretations that 
22 See ibid, point 2 of the operative part of the judgment. 
23 ibid para 4.1 
24 ibid para 1.2. 
25 The Russian Constitutional Court’s reasoning had already been set out in the 
same terms in its earlier 2015 judgment cited above (n 4). 
26 Judgment no 12-P/2016 (n 2) para 4.4. 
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reduce the scope of the provision. The prohibition is to be considered 
as an ‘imperative ban’ ‘with no exceptions’27 and hence there can be no 
room for compromise as regards granting voting rights to prisoners. So 
arguing, the Russian Constitutional Court implicitly rejected one of the 
ECtHR’s solutions to the conflict between the ECHR and the Russian 
legal system, that is, to interpret domestic law in conformity with the 
ECHR and ECtHR case law. No presumption of conformity between 
the Russian Constitution and the ECHR is by contrast permissible, at 
least in the present case, for the Russian Constitutional Court. 
 
 
4.  Examination and critique of the Russian Constitutional Court’s specific 
arguments 
 
Although the Russian Constitutional Court is of the view that its de-
cision in the present case is not a cause for great concern since the right 
to object to a specific ECtHR judgment must be considered ‘as an ex-
ceptional case’,28 in reality its reasoning seeks to dispute the very heart 
of the ECtHR’s power to interpret in a binding way – on the basis of 
rules of interpretation by now widely used in its own case law – the 
provisions of the ECHR and hence jeopardise the Russian Federation’s 
very participation in the ECHR system. 
It would seem that the Russian Constitutional Court has two main 
goals. The first one is to dispute recourse to the method of evolutive in-
terpretation of the ECHR with reference in the present case to Article 3 
of the Protocol no 1 to the Convention. 
In that regard, the Russian Constitutional Court’s arguments are ra-
ther complex. In its view the problem of the conflict between constitu-
tional rules and the ECHR must be tackled and resolved ‘in the context 
of the circumstances and conditions in which Russia has signed and rat-
ified it’.29 Among those ‘original’ conditions is respect for the funda-
mental principles of the Constitution, which as mentioned before en-
tails the supremacy of the Constitution in the Russian legal system.30 For 
27 ibid para 4.1. 
28 ibid para 4.4. 
29 ibid para 4.2. 
30 ibid. 
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that reason it is the Court’s view that ratification of the ECHR by Russia 
was (and still is) conditional on ruling out that at the time there was a 
conflict between Article 32 of the Constitution and Article 3 of Protocol 
no 1 to the Convention. The Court added that its interpretation is con-
firmed by the absence of any objections from the Council of Europe at 
the time of Russian ratification about the existence of conflict between 
the Russian Constitution and the ECHR. Consequently, the ECtHR’s 
subsequent interpretation attributed Article 3 of Protocol no 1 a differ-
ent and evolutive meaning that altered its original meaning and to 
which Russia ‘gave no consent’.31 
From this point of view the Russian Constitutional Court exhibited 
an approach different from that adopted by the Italian Constitutional 
Court in its well-known judgment no 238 of 22 October 2014 regarding 
the constitutional limits to the application in the Italian legal system of 
the international customary law on the immunity of foreign States from 
civil jurisdiction in circumstances where the defendant State is accused 
of grave violations of human rights.32 In that instance, through express-
ing itself to be ‘concerned’ by the content of the customary rule as re-
constructed by the International Court of Justice in the Jurisdictional 
Immunities of the State case33 and highlighting how that content had 
evolved over the course of time, the Italian Constitutional Court did not 
dispute the power of the ICJ to assess the existence of the said custom-
ary rule at international level and apply it to the dispute submitted for 
adjudication (Germany v Italy).34 
In short, the Russian Constitutional Court’s aim would seem to con-
test if not actually eliminate the possibility for the ECtHR to rely on the 
method of evolutive interpretation, thus favouring static interpretation 
not open to variation to keep abreast of continuous and formidable leg-
islative and social changes in Europe and in the international communi-
31 ibid. 
32 It should be noted that in its previous judgment of 2015, it was that same Russian 
Constitutional Court which referred to the case law of other countries including Italy, 
Germany and the United Kingdom (on this point see also n 41). 
33 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening) 
(Merits) [2012] ICJ Rep 99. 
34 See para 3.1 of the part of the Italian Constitutional Court’s judgment no 
238/2014, English translation available at <www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/ 
download/doc/recent_judgments/S238_2013_en.pdf>. 
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ty. If one considers that the methods of interpretation that have enabled 
greater development of the ECHR system are precisely evolutive inter-
pretation and teleological interpretation, it is quite evident that cancel-
lation of evolutive interpretation of the ECHR would have extremely 
negative consequences. 
As for the above mentioned assertion that the conflict between the 
Russian Constitution and the ECHR should be resolved in light of the 
conditions in which Russian ratification occurred – conditions that the 
Russian Constitutional Court claims were not objected to by the Council 
of Europe – the Court (relying on fanciful reasoning of a type that law-
yers are sometimes no strangers to) appears to be stating that the Russian 
ratification of the ECHR essentially contained an ‘implied reservation’ 
regarding the interpretation of Article 3 of Protocol no 1 to the ECHR. 
Ever apart from the fact that international law does not recognise implied 
reservations, it is worth stressing that any such ‘virtual’ reservation would 
contradict the express provisions of Article 57 of the ECHR concerning 
the conditions for formulating reservations and would also clearly be con-
trary to the object and purpose of the ECHR and hence invalid on the 
basis of the ECtHR’s own well known case law on the matter. 
The Russian Constitutional Court’s second goal would seem to be to 
dispute on the merits the reconstruction provided by the ECtHR in the 
Anchugov and Gladkov case relying on the evolutive interpretation 
method already criticised by the Constitutional Court. Indeed, the ‘Eu-
ropean consensus’ found by the ECtHR as to the unlawfulness of a 
blanket ban on electoral rights of convicted persons ‘has not yet 
emerged’ as far as the Russian Constitutional Court is concerned.35  
In order to further clarify its position on this point the Russian Con-
stitutional Court stated that its decision to object to the execution of the 
ECtHR judgment in the Anchugov and Gladkov case serves the specific 
purpose of contributing to the crystallisation of the case law of the ECtHR 
‘in the field of suffrage protection, whose decisions are called upon to re-
flect the consensus having formed among Contracting Parties to the Con-
vention’.36 Therefore, the Russian Constitutional Court (a) maintained 
that no European consensus has ever formed against prisoners automati-
cally losing their right to vote despite the ECtHR’s finding to the contrary 
35 Judgment no 12-P/2016 (n 2) para 4.3. 
36 ibid para 4.4. 
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and (b) attempted to thwart any future formation thereof by coming out 
very strongly against it. 
Again in this respect the Russian Constitutional Court’s approach 
sharply differs from that of other national supreme courts. For example, 
in Italy, although in its judgment no 49 of 26 March 2015 the Constitu-
tional Court introduced rather vague and questionable criteria to limit 
the effects of ECtHR judgments in the Italian legal system,37 it did not 
dispute the ECtHR’s power to interpret the Convention’s provisions in 
an evolutive manner. Indeed, when it came to reviewing the constitu-
tionality of certain provisions of the ECHR and especially their inter-
pretation by the ECtHR, the Italian Constitutional Court sought to 
strike an appropriate balance with the conflicting constitutional values 
that the case before it involves.38 
In conclusion, it is arguable that the Russian Constitutional Court’s 
judgment appears to openly contradict not only the individual funda-
mental provisions of the ECHR but also the entire system of protection 
put in place by the Convention. It constitutes not just a clear violation of 
the obligation to execute ECtHR judgments pursuant to Article 46 of the 
ECHR but also implies casting doubt on the very power of the ECtHR 
‘to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High 
Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols’ pursuant to 
Article 19 of the Convention. From this standpoint it is unquestionable 
that the Russian Constitutional Court’s position on compliance with 
ECtHR judgments is particularly problematic and in ‘open defiance of 
the binding nature of ECtHR judgements’.39 
On a more general level, acceptance of the objections raised by the 
Russian Constitutional Court would be tantamount to creating a special 
37 See, in particular, para 7 of the Italian Constitutional Court’s judgment no 
49/2015, English translation available at <www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/ 
download/doc/recent_judgments/S49_2015_en.pdf>. 
38 Likewise, any comparison with the United Kingdom, where as aforesaid there is a 
similar ‘blanket ban’ regarding the exercise of voting rights by prisoners, in incorrect 
because in that legal system there is not a law comparable to that in Russia capable of 
being used to block the domestic application of any provision of the ECHR and any 
judgment of the ECtHR. Finally, for the distinction between the positions of the 
German Constitutional Court and the Russian Constitutional Court regarding 
observance of the ECHR in domestic legal systems, see the Interim Opinion of the 
Venice Commission (n 3) 23-24, paras 88-92. 
39 See Chaeva (n 3). 
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and more favourable legal regime for the Russian Federation. And as if 
that were not enough, that regime would not be definitely set in stone 
but would be constantly developing and open to change depending on 
subsequent decisions by the Russian Constitutional Court on constitu-
tional provisions other than those considered in the present case. Thus, 
it is our view that through its judgment the Russian Constitutional 
Court would in essence appear to be placing the Russian Federation 
outside the logic of the ECHR system.  
 
 
5.  The constitutional limits to the application of international law in 
domestic legal systems: a useful saving clause or a serious threat to the 
international legal order? 
 
Recourse by constitutional courts to fundamental provisions of their 
respective constitutions to limit the application of international law in 
domestic legal systems by now constitutes one of the most topical and 
highly debated issues at international level.40  
This author is of the conviction that resorting to that legal device 
serves in principle a dual positive function. The first concerns protect-
ing the domestic legal system and ensuring that it holds up well in the 
face of external rules that could upset its overall balance. The second 
concerns protecting some supreme values of the international legal or-
der, such as human rights, where they are prejudiced by some court in-
terpretations of a ‘conservative’ nature and hence not in line with cer-
tain developments in international law.41 In such situations supreme 
courts are afforded an opportunity to pay a subsidiary and more pro-
gressive role, acting on an interpretative level to limit the effects of such 
‘erroneous’ interpretations and if necessary going so far as to block the 
40 On the possible different reasons regarding the application of constitutional 
limits to the respect of international law rules see A Caligiuri, ‘Il punto di vista della 
giurisprudenza costituzionale russa sui rapporti tra CEDU e ordinamento interno’, in 
(2016) 3 Diritti umani e Diritto Internazionale (forthcoming). 
41 On this point see P Pustorino, ‘Coordinamento e conflitto fra norme 
internazionali e regole di organizzazioni internazionali nella giurisprudenza nazionale’ in 
M Vellano (ed), Il futuro delle organizzazioni internazionali. Prospettive giuridiche 
(Editoriale scientifica 2015) 233-235. 
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domestic application of those rules thereby enhancing the chances for 
overcoming those interpretations also at international level. 
However, the Russian Constitutional Court’s judgment adds a new 
worrying element to the debate about using the Constitution as a brake 
to complying with international law because what is lacking in the 
Court’s reasoning, unlike in Italian and German constitutional case law 
before analysed, is any effort to strike a balance between national and 
international values and principles. Certainly one could consider the 
Russian Constitutional Court’s judgment as an example of an ‘abuse’ of 
the resort to constitutional law. Some ‘uncharitable’ minds could even 
see the 2016 judgment as ‘testing the water’ while the Russian Constitu-
tional Court gears up for much more important decisions in relation to 
landmark judgments of the ECtHR (and other international courts) al-
ready adopted against Russia.  
The issue however is not that simple to tackle. Can one really sup-
pose that there is a ‘right and ‘wrong’ way to apply the theory of consti-
tutional limits? And who would be the judge in this regard? The truth is 
that any constitutional judgment depends on the type of constitution 
considered, the constitutional status afforded to international law or 
more specifically some international agreements, the effective force and 
supremacy of the constitution in the domestic legal system, the room for 
manoeuvre that a constitutional court has to interpret the constitution 
in a restrictive or expansive manner to take account of international 
rules, the personal sensibilities of the constitutional judges themselves 
and their independence from executive power, etc.  
If that is so, as we believe it is, then one must ask if and to what ex-
tent it is possible to ‘internationalise’ recourse to such a device, afford-
ing it legitimacy but at the same time setting the boundaries within 
which one can use the ‘internal weapon’ in question.42 The alternative is 
to keep still faith with the principle set out in the previously mentioned 
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and reiter-
ated, as regards international responsibility, in Article 32 of the 2001 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrong-
42 In our view it is excessive to maintain, as one prominent scholar does (B Conforti, 
Diritto internazionale (Editoriale Scientifica 2015) 402-403), that conflict with the 
fundamental rules of a constitution can amount to a veritable circumstance of 
precluding the wrongful act of the State on an international level.  
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ful Acts, according to which a State may not rely on the provisions of its 
internal law as justification for failure to comply with its international 
obligations.  This option is of essence if one considers that a different 
stance would not only be difficult to apply in practice – since it would 
be very complicated to set limits on the recourse to constitutional law as 
a ‘shield’ against the application of international law – but would also 
entail a risk of significantly weakening the effectiveness of the interna-
tional legal system and the reciprocal trust among members of the in-
ternational community regarding observance of international law. 
 
